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NO PAY FOR SEXIST PERFORMANCE: HOW 
GENDER DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE HURT 
HOSPITALS’ PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
REIMBURSEMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Gender disparities and discrimination in healthcare treatment are vast.1 
Women in pain are deemed hysterical,2 heart attacks in women are caught 
less frequently than in men due to symptom presentation differences,3 and 
women are screened less often than men for some cancers.4 Meanwhile, in 
order to be fully reimbursed for healthcare services, legislative reforms 
increasingly evaluate hospitals and physicians based on their performance 
as it relates to quality measurements, otherwise known as pay for 
performance.5 This particular method of reimbursement expanded after the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act6 (ACA) enacted pay for 
performance standards, particularly for hospitals and physicians 
participating in Medicare.7  
The pay for performance standards included in the ACA were a missed 
opportunity to explicitly name and address existing gender disparities in 
healthcare.8 For example, the ACA evaluates and potentially penalizes 
hospitals and doctors based on their quality standards with acute myocardial 
infarctions (commonly known as heart attacks).9 When hospitals actively 
fail to diagnose and to treat heart attacks in women, they may be losing 
                                                      
1. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for Clinical Research and Women’s 
Health Care, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1210–11 (1996). 
2. See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against 
Women in the Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 13, 20 (2001). 
3. See, e.g., Gabrielle R. Chairamonte & Ronald Friend, Medical Students’ and Residents’ 
Gender Bias in the Diagnosis, Treatment, and Interpretation of Coronary Heart Disease Symptoms, 25 
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 255, 263–264 (2006). 
4. See, e.g., Scott E. Woods et al., The Influence of Gender on Colon Cancer Stage, 14 J. 
WOMEN’S HEALTH 502, 504 (2005). 
5. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ICN 907664, HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED 
PURCHASING (2015) https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-M 
LN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_VBPurchasing_FactSheet_ICN907664.pdf [hereinafter HVBP 
FACT SHEET] [https://perma.cc/QF5U-22JL]. Quality measurements are utilized by programs such as 
the Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing and the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program. See 
infra Part II. 
6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
7. See infra Part II.  
8. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o) (2010) 
(demonstrating the statute fails to establish incentives addressing gender disparities in healthcare). 
9. Id. The Secretary establishes a quality measures and hospitals receive compensation based 
on whether they meet these quality measures. Id.  
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reimbursement money under the ACA.10 However, the language of the ACA 
hides the gendered aspect of this loss.11 Gender disparities and 
discrimination in healthcare negatively impact pay for performance 
reimbursements for both hospitals and physicians and result in hospitals 
losing reimbursement payments, especially via Medicare.12 
 To ensure better quality healthcare for female patients and maximum 
reimbursement levels for hospitals and physicians providing Medicare 
services, this Note will examine two categories of possible solutions: 
legislative and ground-based.13 First, Congress could amend the ACA and 
its Medicare provisions to explicitly call for reductions in gender-based 
healthcare disparities.14 Second, hospitals throughout the country could 
implement ground-based efforts such as unconscious bias training for all 
healthcare providers.15   
This Note adopts feminist legal theory as a lens through which to view 
the problem of gender disparities in healthcare and pay for performance 
reforms by asking about gender implications of a law, thus asking “the 
woman question” (“Woman Question”).16 Specifically, this Note asks how 
and why the ACA fails to adequately address gender-based disparities in 
healthcare.17 This question presumes the current law is non-neutral18 and 
seeks to “expose those features and how they operate”19 before turning to 
potential solutions.20 A non-neutral law may appear on its face to be neutral 
towards women and men, but affect women and men differently.21 Asking 
the Woman Question in the context of gender disparities and pay for 
performance reform reveals how women’s healthcare “reflects the 
organization of society rather than the inherent characteristics of women.”22 
Analyzing the ACA through a feminist lens requires a look “beneath the 
                                                      
10. See id. (requiring hospitals to meet certain performance standards in order to receive 
reimbursement/incentive payments). 
11. See id. (failing to require the Secretary to take sex or gender into account when establishing 
quality standards). 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. See infra Part III. 
14. See infra Section III.A. 
15. See infra Section III.B. 
16. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837 (1990). 
Generally, scholars ask: “[H]ave women been left out of consideration? If so, in what way; how might 
that omission be corrected? What difference would it make to do so?” Id. 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. LESLIE FRANCIS & PATRICIA SMITH, Feminist Philosophy of Law, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., Winter 2017), HTTPS://PLATO.STANFORD. 
EDU/ENTRIES/FEMINISM-LAW/ [https://perma.cc/FMS2-BLG8].  
22. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 843. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss1/5
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surface” of the law to identify its gender implications.23 Framing the 
analysis in this way does not necessitate a solution which favors women but 
requires a “decision . . . that is defensible in light of [gender] bias.”24  
Part I of this Note examines the existing gender disparities in healthcare, 
especially in the areas of cardiovascular disease, pain management, and 
cancer. Part II analyzes pay for performance reforms in the ACA. First, Part 
II looks at the Affordable Care Act generally. Then, Part II turns to the 
Medicare reforms in the ACA, focusing on the Hospital Readmissions 
Reduction Program and the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program. Part 
III integrates gender-based disparities in healthcare and pay for performance 
reforms, proposing solutions at both the legislative and ground-based levels. 
The Note argues that if hospitals prompted their physicians to consider, for 
example, the differences in how women and men present with heart attacks, 
the hospitals’ scores on pay for performance quality measures would rise.25 
This in turn would mean higher reimbursement for hospitals, many of which 
desperately need reimbursement funds to remain in business.26 
I. EXISTING GENDER DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE 
Disparities plague the healthcare industry.27 The National Institutes of 
Health defines health disparities “as differences in the incidence, 
prevalence, mortality, and burden of diseases and other adverse health 
conditions that exist among specific population groups.”28 Disparities in the 
healthcare industry appear across many demographics, including gender, 
sex, race, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, and citizenship status.29 
Gender-based disparities30 in the healthcare system are a vast and 
                                                      
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 846. 
25. See infra Part II. 
26. See infra Part II. 
27. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH EQUITY REPORT 2017 10–14 
(2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/health-equity/2017-HRSA-health-equity-report. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/W8NB-FGRS]. 
28. NIH Announces Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH 
(Sept. 27, 2010), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-announces-institute-minority-
health-health-disparities [https://perma.cc/JNT3-HVJS]. 
29. Petry Ubri & Samantha Artiga, Disparities in Health and Health Care: Five Key Questions 
and Answers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (Aug. 2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-
Disparities-in-Health-and-Health-Care-Five-Key-Questions-and-Answers [https://perma.cc/D6DS-GY 
P7]. 
30. There are distinct sociological differences between the terms gender and sex. See Candace 
West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & SOC’Y 125, 125 (1987). Sex is a biological 
marker typically assigned at birth through the visible genitalia or chromosomal typing. Id. at 127. 
Gender, on the other hand, “is the activity of managing situated conduct in light of normative 
conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s sex category.” Id. The Note author 
acknowledges these distinct terms, but for the purpose of this Note will use the terms “sex” and “gender” 
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overlooked problem. A large body of work studies healthcare disparities 
based on race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.31 While this scholarship 
is useful in searching for and proposing solutions to gender-based healthcare 
disparities, this Note will isolate gender as much as possible.  
Medical institutions and providers are not immune to perpetuating 
harmful gender stereotypes that are ingrained in American society.32 Gender 
bias “pervades medicine, beginning with medical-school admissions and 
education, encompassing research facilities and medical journals, and 
culminating in how women are treated as patients in clinics, hospitals, and 
physicians’ offices across the country.”33 For example, society views 
women as much more emotional than men,34 in some cases leading 
providers to classify pain not as a physical problem, but as a mental 
problem.35 Society also views women as better-equipped to deal with pain, 
so healthcare providers may expect women to endure pain more easily than 
men.36 The negative impacts of gender disparities hurt all players in the 
healthcare system, including patients, doctors, hospitals, and insurance 
providers. Gender disparities in healthcare are frequently seen in the 
treatment of cardiovascular disease, pain management, and certain 
cancers.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
interchangeably to speak of biological indicia of sex. Accordingly, the terms “female,” “woman,” and 
“women” will also be used interchangeably.  
31. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003); Janny Scott, Life at the Top in 
America Isn’t Just Better, It’s Longer, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/ 
05/16/us/class/life-at-the-top-in-america-isnt-just-better-its-longer.html. The author also acknowledges 
the importance of examining healthcare disparities via intersectionality although this goes beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
32. See Rothenberg, supra note 1, at 1210. 
33. Id. (quoting LESLIE LAURENCE & BETH WEINHOUSE, OUTRAGEOUS PRACTICES: THE 
ALARMING TRUTH ABOUT HOW MEDICINE MISTREATS WOMEN 7 (1994)). 
34. See, e.g., Frank Newport, Americans See Women as Emotional and Affectionate, Men as 
More Aggressive, GALLUP (Feb. 21, 2001), https://news.gallup.com/poll/1978/americans-see-women-
emotional-affectionate-men-more-aggressive.aspx [https://perma.cc/459V-SG5Y].  
35. See Emalie Marthe, Your Pain Is Not Real: How Doctors Discriminate Against Women, 
BROADLY (Feb. 12, 2017, 7:21 AM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/8x4gwz/your-pain-is-not-
real-how-doctors-discriminate-against-women [https://perma.cc/CA9V-TEXZ].  
36. Id.  
37. See, e.g., Esther H. Chen et al., Gender Disparity in Analgesic Treatment of Emergency 
Department Patients with Acute Abdominal Pain, 15 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 414, 415 (2008); Jodi 
R. Godfrey & JoAnn E. Manson, Toward Optimal Health: Strategies for Prevention of Heart Disease 
in Women, 17 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 1271, 1271 (2008); Woods et al., supra note 4, at 504–05. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss1/5
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A. Cardiovascular Disease 
“Cardiovascular disease38 (CVD) . . . is the number-one killer of 
women”39 and affects approximately 41.3 million women.40 Despite that, 
many physicians perceive women to have a lower risk for cardiovascular 
disease compared to men.41 Women often experience heart attack symptoms 
differently than do men.42 While men tend to feel intense pressure in their 
chest, women “may experience shortness of breath, pressure or pain in the 
lower chest or upper abdomen, dizziness, lightheadedness or fainting, upper 
back pressure or extreme fatigue.”43  
When women do have chest pain, physicians often view their pain as an 
emotional or psychological problem rather than as a manifestation of heart 
attack.44 Physicians also tend to be more influenced by a female patient’s 
psychological symptoms and rely on harmful, negative stereotypes of 
women when they present with symptoms of coronary heart 
disease.45Women with CVD tend to have a higher morbidity rate and 
experience more “impairment in [their] quality of life” compared to 
similarly situated men,46 perhaps as a consequence of underdiagnosing 
CVD in women. 
Gender disparities continue even after doctors diagnose a heart attack 
and begin treatment.47 For example, “men are 6.5 times more likely to be 
referred for cardiac catheterization than women.”48 Further, “26% of men 
                                                      
38. The terms ‘cardiovascular disease’ and ‘heart disease’ are interchangeable. Heart Disease, 
MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/heart-
disease/symptoms-causes/syc-20353118 [https://perma.cc/DQF6-HKAW]. Generally, cardiovascular 
disease “refers to conditions that involve narrowed or blocked blood vessels that can lead to a heart 
attack, chest pain (angina) or stroke.” Id.  
39. ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY ET AL., HER LIFE DEPENDS ON IT II: SPORT, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, 
AND THE HEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN GIRLS AND WOMEN 9 (2009), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED515841.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W7R-6MSX]; Women & Heart 
Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 23, 2017) https://www.cdc.gov/dhdsp/dat 
a_statistics/fact_sheets/fs_women_heart.htm. 
40. STAUROWSKY ET AL., supra note 39, at 9.  
41. Godfrey & Manson, supra note 37, at 1271. 
42. Heart Attack Symptoms in Women, AM. HEART ASS’N (Mar. 30, 2018), http://www.heart.org/ 
HEARTORG/Conditions/HeartAttack/WarningSignsofaHeartAttack/Heart-Attack-Symptoms-in-Wo 
men_UCM_436448_Article.jsp [https://perma.cc/B6XX-JWDN]. 
43. Id. 
44. Chairamonte & Friend, supra note 3, at 263–64. 
45. Id.  
46. Godfrey & Manson, supra note 37, at 1271. 
47. See Rothenberg, supra note 1, at 1210. 
48. Id. 
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versus 14% of women receive clot-dissolving drugs after a heart attack.”49 
Moreover, women of all ages are more likely to be readmitted to a hospital 
following heart attacks.50 Gender disparities in the diagnosis and treatment 
of CVD in women thus present a real and potentially life-threatening 
problem for the women they affect.51 
B. Pain Management 
Physicians tend to take women’s pain less seriously than they do men 
with similar symptoms.52 When doctors treat women’s pain, their treatment 
is consistently inadequate.53 In one study, these differences were true 
“regardless of [the] provider[s’] . . . gender, suggesting that an unconscious 
bias may exist.”54 Research suggests that healthcare providers also tend to 
express disbelief towards women’s pain far more often than they do with 
men.55 
Disparate treatment of pain severely harms women.56 For example, one 
study showed that women were less likely to receive opioid pain medication 
than men.57 Further, the women in the study were forced to wait longer to 
receive pain medication than men, even when they rated their pain level the 
same.58 Other studies articulate gender biases when women present with 
pain.59 When experiencing pain, normatively physically attractive women 
are less likely to be taken seriously by physicians or treated appropriately 
for her pain.60 Unsurprisingly, when healthcare providers do not take 
                                                      
49. Id. 
50. See, e.g., Rachel P. Dreyer et al., Sex Differences in the Rate, Timing and Principal 
Diagnoses of 30-Day Readmissions in Younger Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction, 132 
CIRCULATION 158, 164–65 (2015); Cashel O’Brien et al., Sex Differences in Rates of 30-Day 
Readmission in Patients Discharged After Acute Myocardial Infarction in the United States, 69 J. AM. 
C. OF CARDIOLOGY 2 (2017). 
51. See Chairamonte & Friend, supra note 3; Dreyer et al., supra note 50. 
52. See Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 2, at 21.  
53. See id. at 17.  
54. Chen et al., supra note 37, at 416. 
55. See Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 2, at 17. 
56. See, e.g., Chen et al., supra note 37, at 415; Elizabeth Dougherty, Racial Disparities in 
Opioid Prescriptions, B.U. RES. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.bu.edu/research/articles/racial-bias-opioid-
prescribing/ [https://perma.cc/2U5M-2TZL]; Laura Kiesel, Women and Pain: Disparities in Experience 
and Treatment, HARV. HEALTH BLOG (Oct. 9, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog 
/women-and-pain-disparities-in-experience-and-treatment-2017100912562 [https://perma.cc/8WJ5-V6 
MX].  
57. Chen et al., supra note 37, at 415. This gender bias may have unintended positive 
consequences in light of the opioid addiction crisis. See Dougherty, supra note 56. Researchers observed 
a similar phenomenon along racial lines. Id. Racial bias affects the number of opioids prescribed by 
physicians in some settings. Id. Some have speculated this bias has contributed to the high levels of 
opioid abuse by white people since they are able to more easily obtain opioids. Id.  
58. Chen et al., supra note 37, at 415. 
59. See Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 2, at 21. 
60. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss1/5
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women’s pain seriously, physicians provide lower quality pain management 
methods to women than men.61 
 
C. Cancer 
Gender disparities in clinical decision-making have been shown in both 
colon cancer and lung cancer.62 Women are less likely than men to be 
screened for colon cancer.63 By the time women are actually diagnosed with 
colon cancer, the disease is often at a more advanced stage and thus harder 
to treat.64 When female and male smokers with equal risk factors for lung 
cancer were treated, men were “more likely to be referred for diagnostic 
testing for lung cancer than women.”65 Given the shock and severity of any 
cancer diagnosis, these disparities are particularly concerning.  
The gender disparities present in cardiovascular care, pain management, 
and cancer screening can neither be explained nor justified by medical 
science.66 As such, health disparities based on gender deserve to be critically 
examined.67 Moreover, hospitals and healthcare providers need to be 
encouraged to meaningfully reduce gender-based disparities.68 Pay for 
performance programs may provide one such avenue for meaningful 
change.  
II. PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
Pay for performance, or value-based purchasing, “is an umbrella term for 
initiatives aimed at improving the quality, efficiency, and overall value of 
health care”69 that utilize “financial incentives to hospitals, physicians, and 
other[s] . . . to carry out such improvements and achieve optimal outcomes 
for patients.”70 In regards to the broad appeal for pay for performance, one 
author observed: 
Because patients have a limited ability to observe the quality of care 
                                                      
61. See Kiesel, supra note 56. Another factor contributing to pain management disparities may 
be that most studies on pain are done on men. Id. For pain management, widespread gender disparities 
exist which “can have serious and sometimes fatal repercussions.” Id. 
62. See Rothenberg, supra note 1, at 1210; Woods et al., supra note 4, at 504–05. 
63. Woods et al., supra note 4, at 504–05. 
64. Id. 
65. Rothenberg, supra note 1, at 1210. 
66. See generally Rothenberg, supra note 1 (stating disparate gender treatment partially 
originates from not including women in clinical research). 
67. Id. at 1204. 
68. See infra Part III.s 
69. Julia James, Pay-for-Performance, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 11, 2012), https://www.healthaffairs. 
org/do/10.1377/hpb20121011.90233/full/, [https://perma.cc/7US7-TA3B].  
70. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that they receive, providers have lacked the incentive to provide 
sufficiently high-quality care, resulting in suboptimal quality across 
the health care system . . . . In response, numerous public and private 
payer initiatives have attempted to incentivize higher quality care 
through pay-for-performance programs.71  
This portion of the Note will first look briefly at the goal of the ACA and 
some steps it took to increase the general quality of healthcare. The Note 
will then examine the ACA’s Medicare reform, looking specifically at 
Medicare’s Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program before turning to 
Medicare’s Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program. The Woman 
Question underlies each inquiry into the ACA and its Medicare reform as 
the Note searches for gender implications in each seemingly neutral 
reform.72 All of the recent healthcare reforms stimulates hospitals and 
providers to provide higher quality care for all patients but do not 
necessarily push providers to provide the same quality care to patients 
regardless of gender.73 
A. The Affordable Care Act’s Framing of Gender Disparities 
The primary goal of the ACA was to expand access to health insurance.74 
The ACA proved to be quite effective for reducing “the uninsured rate for 
low-income groups and people of color. . . .”75 However, wide healthcare 
disparities still exist across various dimensions.76 This has been especially 
true for those individuals in the eighteen states that chose not to expand 
Medicaid.77  
The ACA also aimed to develop an all-encompassing “national strategy 
to improve the delivery of health care services, patient health outcomes, and 
population health.”78 To do this, the ACA mandated more data collection, 
including reports on sex-based disparities.79 The law established new 
requirements that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“the 
Secretary”) set forth provider-level outcome measures.80 The provider-level 
                                                      
71. Andrew M. Ryan et al., The Early Effects of Medicare’s Mandatory Hospital Pay-for-
Performance Program, 50 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 81, 82 (2015) (citation omitted). 
72. See supra notes 16 and 21 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra Sections II.A–B. 
74. Summary of the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (April 23, 2013) [hereinafter 
Summary of the ACA], http://files.kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-summary-of-the-affordable-care-act 
[https://perma.cc/82M8-CW6R]. 
75. Ubri & Artiga, supra note 29, at 6. 
76. Id. at 1.  
77. See id. at 6. 
78. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 280j (2010). 
79. Summary of the ACA, supra note 74, at 10. 
80. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 USC § 299b-31 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss1/5
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outcome measures promulgated by the Secretary must generally include 
measures for acute and chronic diseases, in addition to outcome 
measurements for primary and preventative care.81 Tracking preventative 
care outcome measurements is a key part of the ACA’s broad reforms 
impacting gender disparities, given, for example, the lesser amount of 
screening women receive for colon and lung cancers.82 
Expanding access to health insurance, increasing reporting on sex-based 
disparities, and provider-level outcome measures were all important ACA 
reforms. Importantly, meaningful change in gender-based disparities cannot 
be enacted without the ACA’s tracking of these gender-based disparities, 
which enables a critical examination of provider-level outcome 
measurements.83 However, the ACA’s broad quality reforms did not create 
optimal incentives for providers to meaningfully change the actual quality 
of care provided to patients. These broad reforms failed to hit hospitals and 
providers where it hurts—their pocketbooks—to increase the quality of 
patient care. 
B. Medicare 
The ACA more substantively pulled on healthcare providers’ purse 
strings via pay for performance in its Medicare reform.84 Medicare is a huge 
player in the healthcare industry, as it is “the federal health insurance 
program for people who are 65 or older, certain younger people with 
disabilities, and people with End-Stage Renal Disease . . . .”85  
The ACA Medicare reforms utilized many tools intended to positively 
affect healthcare quality for individuals eligible for Medicare.86 In order to 
                                                      
81. Id. 
82. See supra Section I.C. 
83. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
84. What Are the Value-Based Programs?, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 9, 
2017, 3:25 PM) [hereinafter VBP Explanation], https://perma.cc/VEK3-SHGS. 
85. What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/decide-
how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html [https://perma.cc/M949-DCKP] (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2018). Medicare has two primary sections. Dig. Commc’ns Div., Who is Eligible for 
Medicare?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/answers/ 
medicare-and-medicaid/who-is-elibible-for-medicare/index.html [https://perma.cc/D73B-SD59]. Part 
A covers “inpatient care in hospitals, critical access hospitals, and skilled nursing facilities (not custodial 
or long-term care).” Assistant Sec’y for Pub. Affairs, What is Medicare Part A?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/answers/medicare-and-medicaid/what-is-medicare-
part-a./index.html [https://perma.cc/FDA8-E7J8]. Part B, on the other hand, covers medical services 
such as preventative “exams, lab tests, and screening[s] . . . .” Dig. Commc’ns Div., What is Medicare 
Part B?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/answers/medicare-
and-medicaid/what-is-medicare-part-b/index.html [https://perma.cc/L89G-4B2F].  
86. See infra Sections II.B.1–2. In addition to the Readmissions Reduction Program and the 
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, the ACA included subtler, but still important, quality control 
measures such as Hospital Compare data. See About Hospital Compare Data, MEDICARE, 
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/Data/About.html [https://perma.cc/P2SM-N3DJ] (last 
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reach quality of care more directly, the ACA tailored specific reform 
measures, commonly referred to as value-based programs or pay for 
performance, as financial incentives.87 Generally, “[v]alue-based programs 
reward health care providers with incentive payments for the quality of care 
they give . . . .”88 Most of the value-based programs in the ACA were 
directed toward the Medicare program.89 For purposes of addressing 
gender-based disparities in healthcare, the most pertinent of the ACA’s 
value-based programs are the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
(RRP) and the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBP).90 Both 
programs were enacted through the ACA and took effect in 2012.91  
1. Readmissions Reduction Program 
The ACA enacted the RRP as a value-based program targeting hospitals 
participating in Medicare.92 The aim of the RRP is to prevent hospital 
readmissions by providing better quality care up front.93 The RRP originally 
monitored readmissions rates only for heart failure, heart attacks, and 
pneumonia.94 As of 2017, the RRP also tracks diseases such as “chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), elective hip and/or knee 
replacement and coronary artery bypass graft (CABG).”95 The RRP’s 
tracking of heart attacks and heart failure is especially notable, given the 
                                                      
visited June 16, 2018). The data collected concerns hospital performance and examines quality from the 
consumer, or patient, perspective. Id. This can be a useful tool for Medicare patients to compare the 
quality of care they may receive at one hospital or physician’s office versus another one in their same 
area. See id. 
87. See VBP Explanation, supra note 84. 
88. See id.  
89. See infra Sections II.B.1–2. 
90. See VBP Explanation, supra note 84. Other value-based programs enacted in the ACA 
include the End-stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program, Hospital Acquired Conditions Program, 
and the Value Modifier Program. Id. While important reforms in their own right, the impact of these 
programs on gender-based healthcare disparities is beyond the scope of this Note.  
91. Id. 
92. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q) (2010); Readmissions 
Reduction Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 20 2018), https://www.cms.gov/ 
Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Readmissions-Reduction-Program. 
html [https://perma.cc/4MSL-LB9P]. 
93. Casey Ross, The Hospital Readmission Conundrum, WEEK (Dec. 29, 2017), 
http://theweek.com/articles/744345/hospital-readmission-conundrum [https://perma.cc/TLT2-RYSW]. 
Scholars largely agree that the program has worked to reduce readmissions overall, given the “wide body 
of evidence” showing a reduction in readmissions since 2012 when the program went into effect. Id.  
94. Readmissions Reduction Program, supra note 92. 
95. Cristina Boccuti & Giselle Casillas, Aiming for Fewer Hospital U-turns: The Medicare 
Hospital Readmission Reduction Program, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.kff.org/ 
medicare/issue-brief/aiming-for-fewer-hospital-u-turns-the-medicare-hospital-readmission-reduction-
program/ [https://perma.cc/JBJ4-GGNN]. 
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previously discussed gender disparities present in the treatment of 
cardiovascular disease.96  
Medicare considers any readmission into a hospital “within 30 days of 
discharge from an initial hospitalization”97 a readmission for purposes of 
the RRP, regardless of reason.98 Generally, reimbursement payments may 
be reduced for a readmission by “an amount equal to the product of . . . the 
base operating DRG [diagnosis related groups] payment amount . . . and the 
adjustment factor.”99 The maximum penalty rate that can be entered against 
hospitals for readmissions following heart attacks and heart failure is 3% 
from the base payment on all Medicare inpatient admissions.100 The average 
penalty actually assessed in 2017 was 0.74%.101 Since fiscal year 2013, the 
average percentage of hospitals penalized under the RRP has been between 
64% and 79%, with the rate for the last three fiscal years (from 2015 to 
2017) hovering around 78% to 79%.102 
While these numbers suggest the RRP works to reduce overall 
readmissions and encourage hospitals to provide better initial care, the 
impact on Medicare beneficiaries may be limited.103 Proponents of the RRP 
suggest “that financial penalties encourage hospitals to implement activities 
designed to improve care quality and lower their rate of preventable 
readmissions . . . [benefiting] Medicare patients and the Medicare 
Program.”104 However, critics of value-based programs note that many 
Medicare recipients are hospitalized in institutions that are penalized less 
than one percent, perhaps suggesting that the penalty is under-powered and 
too small to make a meaningful impact on institutional behavior.105 Other 
critics argue that the RRP may be harming patients who might need to be 
readmitted by “keeping them out of the hospital” and further jeopardizing 
their health.106 
                                                      
96. See supra Part I. 
97. Boccuti & Casillas, supra note 95. 
98. Id.  
99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(1) (2010). The 
adjustment factor is equal to either the “ratio of the aggregate payments for excess readmission” and the 
“aggregate payments for all discharges” or the floor adjustment factor of 0.97 (whichever is greater). Id.  
100. Boccuti & Casillas, supra note 95, at tbl.1. 
101. Id.  
102. Id.  
103. Boccuti & Casillas, supra note 95. 
104. Id. However, the counterargument to this is also compelling. Since the penalties have reduced 
reimbursement to lower-performing hospitals, teaching hospitals, rural hospitals, and hospitals with 
significant numbers of low-income patients, the programs may be negatively affecting the ability of 
these hospitals to give patients a high quality of care. Id.  
105. Id. Due to concerns regarding penalties disproportionately impacting certain types of 
hospitals, beginning in fiscal year 2019, hospitals will be divided into peer groups with similar numbers 
of inpatients qualifying for both Medicare and Medicaid and will receive performance evaluations 
relative to other like hospitals. Id.  
106. Ross, supra note 93. 
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Given the RRP’s tracking of heart attacks and heart failure, the RRP is 
in a unique position to highlight gender-based healthcare disparities present 
in cardiovascular disease. One study found that in 2013 hospitals 
experienced higher rates of readmission for women than men in the thirty 
days following cardiovascular incidents.107 Because of the higher 
readmission rates for women, under the ACA’s RRP program, hospitals 
themselves are losing reimbursement payments for female Medicare 
patients.108 Since the RRP does not explicitly encourage hospitals to ensure 
physician education regarding gender-based disparities, female patients are 
needlessly harmed and hospitals are needlessly losing Medicare 
reimbursement payments given their inability to address the issue.109  
2. Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program 
The ACA also established the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing 
Program (HVBP) for hospitals participating in Medicare.110 The HVBP 
“rewards hospitals with payments based on the quality of care provided to 
Medicare patients,” among other factors111 The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS)112 may “make[] incentive payments to hospitals 
based on either: [h]ow well they perform on each measure . . . [or] [h]ow 
much they improve their performance on each measure compared to their 
performance during a baseline period.”113  
Through the HVBP, CMS groups a set of measures into defined quality 
domains in order to assess the quality of care Medicare patients receive.114 
For fiscal year 2018, the domains and their respective weights were: patient 
and caregiver-centered experience of care/care coordination (25%), safety 
(25%), clinical care (25%), and efficiency and cost reduction (25%).115 In 
fiscal year 2018, HVBP measures included the thirty-day mortality rate for 
acute myocardial infarctions.116 Pain management satisfaction was included 
through fiscal year 2017.117  
                                                      
107. Cashel O’Brien et al., Comparison of 30-Day Readmission Rates After Hospitalization for 
Acute Myocardial Infarction in Men Versus Women, 120 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1070, 1071, 1074 (2017).  
108. See Boccuti & Casillas, supra note 95. 
109. See id. 
110. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o) (2010). 
111. HVBP FACT SHEET, supra note 5, at 3.  
112. CMS is a department located within the Department of Health and Human Services. About 
CMS, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/About-CMS.html 
[https://perma.cc/27QS-QCSK] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).  
113. HVBP FACT SHEET, supra note 5, at 3. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 4. 
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The process of scoring hospital performance is incredibly complex. At 
its most basic level, hospitals receive a Total Performance Score (TPS) out 
of one hundred points which is derived from the four domains and their 
relative weights.118 HVBP scores the TPS out of one hundred points, with 
the relative weights of the domains in place; however, a hospital who scores 
in just three of the four domains will have their scores “proportionately re-
weighted to the scored domains.”119 For fiscal year 2017 and beyond, the 
HVBP is funded by a 2% reduction in a hospital’s base diagnosis-related 
group payments.120 HVBP redistributes leftover funds as incentive 
payments to hospitals based on their TPS.121 Hospitals may earn back a 
percentage “that is less than, equal to, or more than the applicable reduction 
for that [fiscal year].”122  
One study isolated the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) portion of the patient and caregiver-
centered experience of care/care coordination TPS domain.123 The 
HCAHPS is a survey which “measures . . . the patient experience of care.”124 
HCAHPS points are awarded to hospitals across two different variables—
achievement and improvement.125 Prior to fiscal year 2018, one part of the 
                                                      
118. Total Performance Score Information, MEDICARE, https://perma.cc/CE8P-DEEQ (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2018).  
119. Id. 
120. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(7) (2010); CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED PURCHASING, (Oct. 31, 2017) [hereinafter 
HVBP MOST RECENT], https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_VBPurchasing_Fact_Sheet_ICN907664.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/QF5U-22JL]. Diagnosis related groups (DRG) are the foundation of hospital reimbursement through 
Medicare. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIAGNOSIS 
RELATED GROUP (DRG) 1, https://www.cms.gov/ICD10Manual/version34-fullcode-cms/fullcode_cms/ 
Design_and_development_of_the_Diagnosis_Related_Group_(DRGs)_PBL-038.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
MV8G-5JAE]. DRGs “are a patient classification scheme which provides a means of relating the type 
of patients a hospital treats . . . to the costs incurred by the hospital.” Id. DRGs are based on principal 
and secondary diagnoses, age, sex, procedure, and discharge status. Id. at 13. 
121. HVBP MOST RECENT, supra note 120. “The hospital’s TPS is converted to a value-based 
incentive payment adjustment factor, and that factor is then multiplied by the base operating DRG 
payment amount for each Medicare fee-for-service discharge in a fiscal year to calculate the adjusted 
payment amount that applies to the discharge for that fiscal year.” Hospital VBP Program Aggregate 
Payment Adjustments, MEDICARE, https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/data/payment-adjust 
ments.html [https://perma.cc/A53X-LQP2] (last visited May 29, 2018).  
122. HVBP MOST RECENT, supra note 120. 
123. Marc N. Elliot et al., Understanding the Role Played by Medicare’s Patient Experience 
Points System in Hospital Reimbursement, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1673 (2016). 
124. Id. at 1673. 
125. HVBP MOST RECENT, supra note 120, at 6. 
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patient-experience-of-care domain included pain management,126 an area 
where gender-based healthcare disparities often exist.127 
The improvement points portion of HCAHPS has been shown to better 
performance in lower-performing hospitals.128 Given this finding, some 
scholars suggest that increasing the weight given to improvement points 
might be a useful tool to decrease socioeconomic and racial and ethnic 
disparities.129 If CMS decides to reintroduce a pain management axis,130 the 
HVBP scheme could be utilized to indirectly reduce the gender-based 
disparities in pain management. Since women are less likely to receive 
opioid pain medication than men and are forced to wait longer to receive 
pain medication than men,131 it is fair to speculate that their responses on 
the HCAHPS are reducing the number of bonuses given to hospitals. Even 
if the pain management axis is not directly reintroduced, CMS will continue 
to collect important data on pain management via the Hospital Inpatient 
Quality Reporting Program132 which should be used as an impetus for more 
equal pain management between women and men. 
The HVBP Program has been controversial and is certainly not without 
its critics.133 The intent of HVBP was always to increase the quality of care 
without furthering any health disparities.134 However, the first study to 
evaluate HVBP implementation found no evidence of quality improvement 
when compared to hospitals not under HVBP provisions.135 The study did 
find that, when assuming the impact of HVBP began three years before the 
financial incentives, there was an “improvement on clinical process 
performance” for hospitals under HVBP.136 Critics of HVBP also note that 
pay for performance may fail to decrease, and may even exacerbate, 
                                                      
126. HVBP MOST RECENT, supra note 120, at 4. “Due to potential confusion about the appropriate 
use of the Pain Management dimension questions,” CMS removed the domain and is reformulating its 
questions. 81 Fed. Reg. 79562, 79857 (Nov. 4, 2016). There is some likelihood the dimension will return. 
Id. at 79856. 
127. See supra Section II.B. 
128. Elliot et al., supra note 123, at 1677. 
129. Id. at 1679. 
130. 81 Fed. Reg. 79562, 79856 (Nov. 4, 2016). 
131. See Chen, supra note 37, at 416. 
132. 81 Fed. Reg. 79562, 79859 (Nov. 4, 2016). 
133. See, e.g., Ryan et al., supra note 71; Jordan Rau, Doctor-owned Hospitals Prosper under 
Health-Care Law, WASH. POST (April 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/doctor-owned-hospitals-prosper-under-health-care-law/2013/04/13/d25888f0-a45a-11e2-82bc-
511538ae90a4_story.html [https://perma.cc/93U7-2B2J] (stating that physician-owned hospitals may 
cherry-pick the healthiest, wealthiest patients allowing for inflated performance on quality 
measurements).  
134. Elliot et al., supra note 123, at 1674, 1678-79; see also Ryan et al., supra note 71, at 92. 
135. See also Ryan et al., supra note 71, at 92. 
136. Id. The study used a three year assumption since “hospitals may have anticipated the start of 
HVBP and begun to improve quality performance . . . .” Id. at 89. 
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disparities if they “reward only high levels of absolute performance.”137 
These critics say that HVBP is harmful because it disproportionately 
penalizes healthcare organizations serving “disadvantaged populations 
[who are] already less likely to receive recommended care.”138 These 
critiques, while valid, can be addressed by more closely tailoring HVBP 
domains to align with the disparities that they explicitly wish not to 
exacerbate.139 Another way to make HVBP more effective is to increase the 
financial penalty to more forcefully prompt hospitals to comply with quality 
standards.140 Regardless, due to the potential for an adverse effect on 
disparities, the HVBP must be closely monitored and evaluated and should 
be allowed to change and grow over time.141 
On its face, the ACA, including its Medicare reforms such as the RRP 
and HVBP, does not facially discriminate against women in any way.142 In 
fact, the ACA reforms pull on various policy levers intended to improve the 
quality of care for all people regardless of gender.143 However, asking the 
Woman Question shows that the ACA is non-neutral because gender-based 
disparities in healthcare persist despite the ACA’s attempts to improve 
quality.  
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO GENDER DISPARITIES AS A PAY FOR 
PERFORMANCE ISSUE 
Since the ACA is non-neutral, healthcare stakeholders must search for 
solutions to adequately address gender-based disparities. Gender-based 
disparities in healthcare affect the quality measurements utilized under the 
ACA to determine pay for performance.144 However, given the prevalence 
and harm of these disparities, the ACA fell short with programs like the 
RRP or the HVBP. By adjusting the incentives available through these 
programs, the ACA could decrease gender-based disparities in healthcare. 
There are legislative solutions available, and hospitals should seek their own 
solutions to gender-based disparities from the ground up.  
A. Legislative Solutions through the Affordable Care Act and Healthcare 
Reform Efforts 
                                                      
137. Elliot et al., supra note 123, at 1674. 
138. Tingyin T. Chee et al., Current State of Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 133 
CIRCULATION 2197, 2203 (2016).  
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 2201. 
141. Id. at 2203. 
142. See Bartlett, supra note 16; supra text accompanying note 18. 
143. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww, 208j (2010). 
144. See supra Part I. 
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The ACA includes a built-in mechanism for financially penalizing 
hospitals for under-performing on quality-of-care measures.145 However, 
nowhere in the ACA pay for performance system, which includes the RRP 
and the HVBP, are disparities explicitly mentioned.146 The HVBP program 
include items like the thirty-day mortality rate from acute myocardial 
infarctions and, until fiscal year 2018, pain management.147 These domains 
track where cardiovascular and pain management disparities exist, but the 
legislation itself is silent on the actual disparities present.148  
This inattention to disparities likely hurts hospitals’ bottom lines as well 
as female patients. Since the ACA fails to explicitly provide incentives 
aimed at decreasing gender-based disparities, the disparities remain 
invisible and excluded from the priority list for hospitals.149 However, if the 
ACA encouraged hospitals and their physicians to consider, for example, 
the differences in the ways in which women and men present with heart 
attacks, the hospital’s scores for clinical process domains would likely rise 
and the rate of readmissions following heart attacks would likely decrease. 
This would mean higher reimbursements for the hospitals, many of which 
desperately need Medicare reimbursement to remain in business.150 
When considering how to address gender disparities in healthcare, it may 
be useful to follow the lead of studies looking at racial and ethnic disparities 
in healthcare.151 The National Quality Forum (NQF)152 suggests that pay for 
performance tools could more effectively decrease disparities if the 
measurements are based on explicitly lowering disparities themselves, 
instead of “paying for higher-quality performance applied generally to all 
patients.”153 Moreover, the NQF suggests pay for performance could also 
be “based [specifically on] improving quality of care for minority 
populations.”154 
                                                      
145. See supra notes 84 and 86 and accompanying text.  
146. VBP Explanation, supra note 84. 
147. See HVBP FACT SHEET, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
148. HVBP FACT SHEET, supra note 5. 
149. See supra Part II. 
150. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, FACTSHEET: RURAL AND SMALL HOSPITALS, https://www.aha.org/ 
system/files/content/16/fs-ruralsmall.pdf [https://perma.cc/875H-L6G5]. The American Hospital 
Association has called for relief from Medicare regulations, or, at a minimum, consideration of the 
unique circumstances of rural hospitals, given their heavy reliance on Medicare reimbursement. Id. 
151. See, e.g., NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES AND CULTURAL COMPETENCY 
CONSENSUS STANDARDS 7 (Sept. 2012), https://www.qualityforum.org/Publications/2012/09/ 
Healthcare_Disparities_and_Cultural_Competency_Consensus_Standards_Technical_Report.aspx 
[hereinafter CULTURAL COMPETENCY] [https://perma.cc/W5HW-SVS4]. 
152. The National Quality Forum is a “not-for-profit, nonpartisan, membership-based 
organization that works to catalyze improvements in healthcare.” About Us, NAT’L QUALITY F. (2018), 
http://www.qualityforum.org/About_NQF/ [https://perma.cc/T8FE-RJRN]. The organization works to 
“enhance healthcare value, make patient care safer, and achieve better outcomes.” Id. 
153. CULTURAL COMPETENCY, supra note 151, at 7.  
154. Id. 
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When creating future healthcare reforms, either direct changes to the 
ACA or any other attempt at reform, lawmakers must make disparities 
explicit within pay for performance models.155 By raising the expectations 
of healthcare institutions and providers and demanding they address any 
gender disparities—or racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic disparities—head-
on, they will be on notice that such disparities exist and be encouraged to 
make substantive, meaningful change for their patients.156 Not only will 
female patients benefit, but healthcare institutions and physicians will see 
better quality outcomes, and thus greater levels of reimbursement and 
payment, when treating patients suffering from cardiovascular disease, pain 
management issues, and cancer prevention or any other area in which 
gender disparities exist.  
Making gender-based disparities in healthcare explicitly visible through 
the RRP may prove challenging. For example, it is untenable and 
undesirable for a multitude of reasons to consider penalizing hospitals more 
for a woman’s readmission than a man’s.157 However, for the HVBP, a 
“reduction in healthcare disparities” domain could be added.158 This domain 
could be further broken down into subsections—like the clinical care 
domain already is—along gender, socioeconomic status, and racial and 
ethnic groups.159 The score in this domain could then become part of an 
institution’s TPS score and utilized to calculate the reimbursement rate in 
the usual manner.160 Explicitly identifying disparities could encourage 
healthcare institutions and providers acknowledge disparities and work to 
reduce them.161 As previously discussed, not only will these changes 
improve outcomes for female patients, but the hospitals could increase the 
rates of reimbursement from TPS payments bolstering their bottom lines.162  
B. Hospital-Based Solutions 
Because their net revenue is directly impacted, hospitals have stronger 
incentives to address gender disparities in their own facilities than Congress, 
and they can certainly do so more quickly. Simply by raising awareness of 
gender-based disparities, hospitals can encourage their healthcare providers 
                                                      
155. See Chee et al., supra note 138, at 2203. 
156. See CULTURAL COMPETENCY, supra note 151. 
157. Nor should a solution based on asking the Woman Question be about finding solutions which 
only benefit women. See Bartlett, supra note 16, at 846. 
158. See HVBP FACT SHEET, supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
159. Id. 
160. See Total Performance Score Information, supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 151 and 154 and accompanying text. 
162. See Total Performance Score Information, supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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to implement changes in the way they diagnose patients, thus increasing 
quality of care and, with it, Medicare reimbursements. 
As previously discussed, many of the gender-based disparities in 
healthcare stem from harmful, and frequently unconscious, gender 
stereotypes and biases. “Unconscious biases are social stereotypes about 
certain groups of people that individuals form outside their own conscious 
awareness.”163 These biases exist along many axes including gender, sexual 
orientation, religion, weight, race, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity.164 
Examples of such biases include the perception that women are significantly 
more emotional than men—causing providers to classify women’s pain as 
a mental problem—or conversely, viewing women as inherently more 
capable of dealing with pain—causing providers to undertreat female 
pain.165 One way to minimize these biases might be to require unconscious 
bias training for any healthcare provider in the hospital.166 Unconscious bias 
training, while somewhat controversial,167 has evidence supporting its 
efficacy.168 
Unconscious bias training is vital for healthcare professionals, as it may 
help to make it easier to recognize unconscious bias and to mitigate the harm 
of the biases.169 Educating healthcare providers on the subtle forms, 
manifestations, harms, and consequences of stereotypes and bias gives them 
the knowledge and opportunity to work on minimizing biases and 
stereotypes in their own work with patients.170 In so doing, the providers 
may be more likely to recognize the symptoms of heart attacks and heart 
disease in women.171 They may be more receptive toward women feeling 
intense pain and treat the pain more appropriately, thereby potentially 
increasing their score in the patient and caregiver-centered experience of the 
                                                      
163. Unconscious Bias, U.C., S.F. OFF. DIVERSITY & OUTREACH, https://diversity.ucsf.edu/res 
ources/unconscious-bias [https://perma.cc/G88P-YBHB] (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
164. Id. 
165. Marthe, supra note 35.  
166. The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) offers limited opportunities for 
health professionals to receive training on unconscious biases. See Unconscious Bias Training for the 
Health Professions, ASS’N AM. MED. COLLS., https://www.aamc.org/initiatives/diversity/322996/lab 
learningonunconsciousbias.html [https://perma.cc/KLE7-QTPU] (last visited May 29, 2018). In 2017, 
the AAMC offered an “Every Day Bias Workshop for the Health Professions” and an “Unconscious 
Bias Train-the-Trainer Program for the Health Professions.” Id. 
167. See Jessica Nordell, Is This How Discrimination Ends?, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/05/unconscious-bias-training/525405/ [https://per 
ma.cc/7ZHY-CUPZ]. 
168. Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice Habit-
Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267, 1277 (2012). 
169. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., supra note 166. 
170. This may be especially important for healthcare providers as “biases may be more prevalent 
when multitasking or working under time pressure.” U.C., S.F. OFF. DIVERSITY & OUTREACH, supra 
note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
171. See Godfrey & Mason, supra note 37. 
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care/care coordination domain.172 Similarly, they may become aware of the 
need to screen men and women for cancer at equal rates, especially when 
there is no medical evidence that men and women need to be screened at 
different rates.173 
Hospitals are well-situated to make more immediate, and perhaps more 
impactful, reductions in gender-based healthcare disparities than Congress 
by providing ground-level training on the unconscious biases all people 
carry. Such a solution has some appeal, given the relative ease, speed, and 
low cost of implementing unconscious bias training.174 While legislative 
reform to the ACA and its Medicare reform might create stronger financial 
incentives for institutions, hospital-based solutions might appeal more to 
providers seeking a successful reduction in healthcare disparities at the local 
level in a relatively short amount of time.175 Additionally, hospital-based 
solutions are not subject to the numerous political barriers and typically 
slow pace inherent in legislative healthcare reform.176  
CONCLUSION 
This Note examined the ways in which gender disparities and value-
based programs interplay in the healthcare system. The Note explained 
some of the most common and most concerning gender-based disparities, 
showing that these disparities are seen in areas such as cardiovascular 
disease, pain management, and cancer. 
This Note then provided an overview of different value-based programs 
in existence while using feminist legal theory to ask the Woman Question. 
It first explained the broad measures found within the ACA to increase 
access and improve quality. The Note proceeded to examine the ACA’s 
Medicare reform programs, including the RRP and the HVBP. It showed 
                                                      
172. See supra Sections I.B, II.B.1. 
173. See supra Section I.C. 
174. See Unconscious Bias Train-the-Trainer for Healthcare Professionals, COOK ROSS INC., 
https://cookross.com/product/unconscious-bias-train-trainer-healthcare-professionals/ [https://perma.cc 
/E59N-TV3X] (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). Cook Ross Inc. partnered with the AAMC to provide a four-
day training program for $3,995.00. Id.  
175. See, e.g., Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/K47S-7Z4U] (last visited Feb. 4, 2018) (stating that only 3% 
of proposed bills became enacted law between 2015 and 2017). 
176. See, e.g., Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: There Are Plenty of Health-Care 
Issues at Stake in the Government Spending Fight, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2018/01/04/the-health-202-there-are-plenty-of-
health-care-issues-at-stake-in-the-government-spending-fight/5a4d24b430fb0469e883fee3/?utm_term 
=.7d382506976f [https://perma.cc/4HRL-BS6G]; David Weigel, McConnell Says Effort To Repeal 
Affordable Care Act Is ‘Probably’ Over, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/12/21/mcconnell-says-effort-to-repeal-affordable-care-act-is-
probably-over/ [https://perma.cc/S5HG-ZYBY]. 
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how these programs may or may not be effective in highlighting and solving 
gender-based disparities in healthcare. 
Finally, this Note proposed solutions to the ACA’s lack of neutrality 
which would both increase the quality of healthcare received by women and 
increase the reimbursement payments to hospitals under the various pay for 
performance programs. Potential solutions include legislative reforms to the 
RRP or the HVBP. Solutions may also include more ground-up reforms 
from hospitals themselves such as unconscious bias training.  
Gender disparities in healthcare treatment are clearly pay for 
performance issues that impact Medicare, hospitals, and physicians. By 
failing to include comprehensive gender disparity resolutions in the quality 
measures hospitals use, hospitals are penalizing themselves under the legal 
guidelines of the ACA and Medicare reform. 
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